22.04.2024
Over the past few years, the Second Thomas Shoal has become the main flashpoint of the dispute in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines. This geographical feature has assumed centrality within China's strategic initiatives, particularly characterized by its engagement in so-called "grey zone” activities. These activities prominently feature proxy warfare tactics, notably demonstrated through coercive measures undertaken by entities such as China's Coast Guard (CCG) and the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Through the deployment of diverse grey zone tactics, the Beijing administration has significantly strengthened its strategic position in the South China Sea since 2013. However, despite the intensified operational endeavors surrounding the Second Thomas Shoal by the Chinese government, tangible achievements remain elusive. Moreover, the exacerbation of tensions has prompted a shift in the Philippine government's approach, resulting in the consolidation of alliances with congenial nations and the adoption of a proactive stance aimed at mitigating China's Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategies in the region. Consequently, it warrants examination whether China has reached the limit of efficacy within the grey zone, a strategic approach ostensibly designed to assert expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea through activities below the threshold of war.
The Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef located approximately 194 kilometers west of the Philippine island of Palawan, falls distinctly within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and upon the Philippine continental shelf. Whereas, the reef is situated over 1000 kilometers distant from the nearest Chinese territory, Hainan Island. The Philippines maintains a marines detachment stationed at Second Thomas Shoal aboard a Philippine navy vessel, the BRP Sierra Madre, which was intentionally grounded at the site in 1999 and has since functioned as an outpost. This outpost assumes a crucial role in consolidating the Philippines' strategic position within the South China Sea. Nonetheless, its operational sustainability necessitates regular resupply and rotation missions, which have been systematically organized since its establishment.
In 2013, China initiated an expansive campaign to assert and consolidate its territorial claims within the South China Sea, primarily through extensive reclamation endeavors at seven distinct locations. Concurrently, the CCG commenced routine patrols around the Second Thomas Shoal, during which it engaged in obstructive behaviors towards Philippine resupply missions. Despite sporadic incidents, the situation was relatively stable. However, since 2022, there has been a notable escalation in CCG and PAFMM activities, characterized by heightened presence and increasingly aggressive tactics deployed around the shoal to hinder Philippine resupply missions. The Chinese government contends that the blockade of resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre aims to prevent the delivery of construction materials intended to expand the Philippine outpost into a more permanent structure.
According to a report compiled by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, spanning the years 2021 to 2023, the Philippines executed a total of 30 resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal. While in 2021, an average of one Chinese vessel was observed in proximity to the shoal during such missions, by 2023, this figure surged to fourteen ships. In contrast, Philippine vessel presence remained relatively steady over the three-year period, averaging between 2 to 3 vessels. The escalation in the number of Chinese ships near the shoal corresponded with an uptick in major incidents, particularly pronounced in 2023. Notably, a single significant incident was reported in both 2021 and 2022. In November 2021, two CCG vessels employed water cannons for the first time to obstruct two Filipino boats (Unaiza Mae 1 and Unaiza Mae 3) from delivering supplies to the BRP Sierra Madre. Subsequently, in August of the following year, a CCG vessel revealed a 70mm naval gun while blockading a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship. The most substantial accumulation of physical confrontations between Philippine and Chinese vessels occurred in 2023, with five serious incidents recorded. In February, a CCG vessel bearing bow number 5205 deployed a "military-grade" laser towards the crew of BRP Malapascua, the PCG vessel supporting a rotation and resupply mission. In August, November, and December, the CCG resorted to water cannon usage against PCG and resupply vessels. Furthermore, collisions between ships of both countries transpired in October and December, stemming from dangerous maneuvers executed by the CCG.
In light of the marked escalation in maritime incidents surrounding the Second Thomas Shoal within the preceding three years, there is a strong indication that tensions within the South China Sea will persistently escalate. Recent events occurring in the first quarter of 2024 further underscore this trend. Specifically, in March of this year, two dangerous situations emerged wherein the CCG conducted dangerous maneuvers and used water cannons, resulting in a total of seven crew members on board a Philippine supply vessel (Unaizah May 4) suffering minor injuries.
Despite China's adoption of increasingly aggressive measures in its grey zone activities, the Philippine resupply missions conducted in 2023 and during the initial months of 2024 were successful. Consequently, Beijing failed to achieve its objective of severing the BRP Sierra Madre outpost from essential supplies, a scenario that would have facilitated taking control over the Second Thomas Shoal. These developments suggest that Beijing has exhausted its repertoire of measures to deter the Philippines below the threshold of open armed conflict. This observation carries significant implications, as any escalation to direct violence, constituting a shift to the next level on the escalation ladder, would result in a severe reputational loss and strategic setback for China, particularly when pitted against a considerably weaker state.
The efficacy in limiting the effectiveness of China's activities in the grey zone is intricately linked to the Philippines' adoption of a new tactic involving publicizing China's assertive conduct in the South China Sea, beginning in February 2023. This approach is termed in various ways, including "assertive transparency," "measured transparency," or "strategic transparency," with the former two terms being predominantly utilized. The concept of "assertive transparency" was extensively elucidated by Ray Powell, the Director of SeaLight and Project Lead for Project Myoushu at Stanford University's Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. Conversely, representatives of the Philippine government are inclined towards employing the term "measured transparency," which inherently conveys a less confrontational stance while emphasizing the strategic nature of this tactic.
The Philippine government's systematic documentation and publication of Chinese vessel activities within the disputed regions of the South China Sea, coupled with close collaboration with both domestic and international media outlets under the measured transparency framework, have fostered heightened public endorsement within the Philippines for decisive measures to safeguard the nation's sovereignty. A prime illustration of such measures is the execution of resupply missions for soldiers stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre, notwithstanding the formidable pressure and aggressive actions exerted by the CCG. In addition to executing resupply missions, the public disclosure of information pertaining to these missions is paramount. In 2021, the public was apprised of only three out of seven missions, resulting in a reporting rate of 43%. By contrast, in 2023, the reporting rate nearly doubled, reaching 80%. The efficacy of this initiative is evidenced by public opinion surveys conducted by OCTA Research in December 2023, wherein 61% of respondents expressed support for the Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration's initiatives concerning tensions in the South China Sea. It is noteworthy that compared to analogous research conducted in the third quarter of 2023, there was a 3% surge in support, indicating a sustained growth in the number of proponents.
The transparency initiative undertaken by the Philippines concerning issues pertaining to the South China Sea dispute also serves international objectives, thereby incrementally heightening pressure on China. Subsequent reports detailing instances where the Philippines falls victim to China's coercive actions elicit growing international attention. The latest incident involving the utilization of water cannons by the China Coast Guard (CCG) against a resupply mission conducted at the conclusion of March 2023 prompted the issuance of special statements by the European Union, alongside several nations including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, Germany, France, Canada, Australia, and India. Predominantly, these statements signify solidarity with the Philippines, while also expressing concern regarding the escalation of tensions within the South China Sea dispute and the violation of international. In some cases, statements also include direct condemnation of Chinese actions, which strengthens the Filipino agency in the international arena.
Another notable aspect to consider is that the new tactic employed by the Philippines has markedly heightened the likelihood of China incurring progressively severe reputational damage on the global stage in the event of an escalation of coercive actions within the grey zone. From Beijing's standpoint, this holds particular significance concerning countries of the Global South. On one hand, these nations play a pivotal role in China's strategy to establish a new international order. However, on the other hand, they harbor criticisms toward the policies of major powers reliant on coercion to advance their individual interests, often at the expense of weaker nations.
Chinese activities near the Second Thomas Shoal in recent years have failed to yield any discernible success in enhancing control over the disputed areas of the South China Sea. Concurrently, Beijing's approach has contributed to a deepening of public skepticism in the Philippines toward China. According to the latest The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Report released by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, in the event of being compelled to align with either China or the United States, the majority of Filipinos would align with the United States. Furthermore, the Philippines has emerged as the foremost supporter of the United States among ASEAN member states for two consecutive years. In the 2023 report, 78.8% of Filipino respondents favored the United States, a figure which rose to 83.3% in this year's report. Moreover, in early December 2023, public opinion polls conducted by Pulse Asia revealed that an overwhelming majority of respondents (79%) endorsed closer cooperation with the United States in economic and security domains, particularly amidst tensions in the South China Sea.
The strengthening of anti-Chinese sentiments in the Philippines should be regarded as yet another setback of Beijing's assertive policy within the grey zone, with long-term effects which we can already observe. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has undertaken a strategic reorientation of the Philippine armed forces from internal to external threats. Furthermore, in March of this year, Gilberto Teodoro Jr., the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND), disclosed the adoption of the new Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) aimed at safeguarding Philippine territory, including its EEZ. Additionally, Manila has fortified its ties with the United States by adding four new locations to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Moreover, it has developed bilateral relations with other regional stakeholders such as Japan and Australia, while also deepening collaboration in minilateral formats such as the Philippines-Japan-United States (JAPHUS) and the Philippines-Japan-United States-Australia. Consequently, the Philippines' position has been bolstered, and in the event of Beijing's risk-taking escalation through direct attack, the Chinese government would not only need to consider the prospect of invoking Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty but also the involvement of other regional powers.
Numerous indicators suggest a deliberate shift by the United States away from the hub-and-spokes system towards the cultivation of minilateral frameworks, potentially engendering alterations in the security paradigm within the Indo-Pacific region over time. Historically, the United States assumed primary responsibility for upholding security and stability in the region. However, emerging trends suggest an increasing delegation of such responsibilities to middle powers within the region, such as Japan and Australia, but also partly by the Philippines.