Kim Jong Un in Beijing: A Diplomatic Breakthrough?

Joanna Beczkowska

13.10.2025

Kim Jong Un’s participation in Beijing’s Victory Day celebrations on September 3rd, 2025, marked his first international appearance of this scale since 2011. Standing alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, he projected North Korea as part of a Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang triangle, challenging the U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance. While most attention focused on great-power dynamics, the visit carried major implications for Seoul and Europe alike.

3-minute read

Key Points

• Breakthrough moment: Kim joined global leaders in Beijing for the first time in 14 years, symbolizing North Korea’s bid for international recognition.

• Seoul’s cautious absence: President Lee Jae-myung skipped the event to avoid undermining U.S. ties after his Trump summit, sending Speaker Woo Won-shik instead.

• Consolidating blocs: The Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang axis now directly opposes the U.S.-ROK-Japan partnership.

• Implications for Europe: This shift deepens bloc politics and weakens UN consensus on denuclearisation, but it also creates opportunities for stronger EU–ROK cooperation in cyber defence, supply chains, and sanctions and primarily to uphold international law as a vital instrument for global solutions.

 

Before the Visit to Beijing

Ahead of the event, President Lee Jae-myung stressed dialogue and peaceful coexistence in his Liberation Day speech (August 15). A joint appearance with Kim Jong Un at the Victory Day celebrations could have served as a moment to resume contact, but Lee had already signalled he would not attend, sending National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik instead.

The decision was a result of careful diplomatic calculation. Participation alongside Xi and Putin soon after the Trump summit (August 25) carried a risk of signalling a tilt toward Beijing, potentially damaging the Seoul-Washington alliance. Another reason came from political experience. Park Geun-hye’s participation in the 70th Victory Day anniversary in Beijing in 2015 (as the only leader from the Western camp) was initially welcomed in South Korea as prioritising national interests over alliances. Yet relations soured after Seoul’s 2016 THAAD deployment, turning the move into a “Park Geun-hye trauma” (박근혜 트라우마), a warning that excessive closeness with Beijing, which risks damaging ties with Washington, can quickly backfire if disputes arise.

Learning from this precedent, President Lee Jae-myung pursued a pragmatic compromise: he skipped the event but sent National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik, the country’s second-ranking official, signalling both caution toward China and commitment to the U.S. alliance.

Inter-Korean Dimension

The South Korean government prepared Woo Won-shik for a possible encounter with Kim Jong Un, but expectations were low. Analysts pointed to Pyongyang’s continued rejection of Seoul’s overtures, emphasising that dialogue could not resume without progress in U.S.–DPRK relations. National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac has publicly stated that Pyongyang displayed a “very passive and negative attitude” and the government acknowledged that focusing on engagement under current conditions would be a “misjudgment of the situation”.

Ultimately, Kim and Woo exchanged only brief greetings before the parade. The media described the handshake as purely symbolic, underscoring Seoul’s limited role. Woo reportedly conveyed Seoul’s message of peace to Putin, hoping it would reach Pyongyang indirectly.

Consequences for Seoul

Kim Jong Un’s participation in the Victory Day parade highlighted several strategic challenges for President Lee Jae-myung and his administration. The event made it clear that the Moscow–Beijing–Pyongyang axis is becoming increasingly united, creating a direct counterweight to the U.S.–ROK–Japan partnership and entrenching polarisation on the Korean Peninsula within the broader global rivalry. Backed by China and Russia, Pyongyang now enjoys greater negotiating leverage, enabling it to act more assertively and making international pressure for denuclearisation more difficult to sustain. At the same time, Kim signalled that his diplomatic priorities lie with Beijing, Moscow, and Washington, effectively sidelining Seoul and reducing its role in shaping inter-Korean dynamics. By elevating Kim on the global stage, Beijing has also conveyed its frustration with South Korea’s closer alignment with Washington and Tokyo, implying that progress with Pyongyang will only be possible through deeper engagement with China. Finally, the strengthening of DPRK–China–Russia ties heightens security risks by increasing the likelihood of coordinated provocations, including joint exercises designed to test Seoul’s responses. 

Europe in the context 

For the European Union, Kim Jong Un’s presence in Beijing underscores the deepening of global bloc politics, complicating Brussels’ balancing act of maintaining constructive ties with China while opposing Russia’s war in Ukraine. The consolidation of a Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang axis also undermines the EU’s long-standing support for denuclearisation talks and sanctions enforcement at the UN, as Security Council consensus becomes harder to achieve. At the same time, these shifts create opportunities for the EU to expand strategic partnerships with like-minded partners such as South Korea. The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific already prioritises cyber defence, resilient technology supply chains, and digital cooperation, while the EU–ROK Summit upgraded relations into a broader strategic partnership that includes coordination on sanctions and responses to North Korea’s nuclear program. Together, these policy frameworks highlight both the risks of marginalisation in an era of hardened blocs and the opening for Europe to strengthen deterrence and resilience through closer cooperation with Seoul.

Conclusion

For Seoul, Kim Jong Un’s appearance in Beijing underscored the consolidation of a hostile coalition, China’s growing diplomatic leverage, and the narrowing space for inter-Korean dialogue. The event forced Seoul to recalibrate its foreign policy: reinforcing alliances with the U.S. and Japan, while keeping channels open to Beijing to avoid marginalisation. Domestically, the debate revealed deep awareness of South Korea’s constrained role in shaping peninsula dynamics. In the longer term, the growing Moscow–Beijing–Pyongyang cooperation highlights the need for stronger deterrence and broader coalitions.

For Europe, the visit is another reminder of hardened bloc politics. It complicates Brussels’ balancing act between China and Russia but also creates space for closer EU-ROK cooperation in areas such as cyber defence, resilient supply chains, and sanctions coordination. Kim’s symbolic elevation in Beijing thus challenges both Seoul’s security strategy and Europe’s capacity to adapt in an increasingly polarised global order.