



**CENTRE FOR  
ASIAN AFFAIRS**  
University of Lodz

**CAA PAPERS**

**FRAMING AI AT THE UN:  
CHINA'S DISCURSIVE STRATEGY  
FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE**

---

**Dominik Mierzejewski**  
**Martyna Sulima Samujłó**  
April 2026

## SUMMARY

The central feature of China's discourse on AI in the United Nations from 2024 to 2025 is the deliberate use of normative ambiguity. China's AI discourse exemplifies flexible norm entrepreneurship, emphasising broad principles that can accommodate diverse political systems and levels of development. This approach limits external scrutiny and preserves room for domestic policy variation. At least in China's diplomatic language, the country is also positioning itself as the leader of the Global South and promotes an UN-centric, inclusive, multilateral style of AI governance. AI discourse is most frequently linked to development and governance, and AI is mentioned either as a development enabler and equaliser or in the context of rulemaking.

This policy brief was prepared within the framework of the research project "Redefinition of Multilateralism through Relationality: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations." The project is funded by the National Science Centre, Poland (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) under grant UMO-2024/53/B/HS5/02879

## KEY FINDINGS

1. **AI is framed as a development equaliser**, with a strong emphasis on bridging the digital and technological divide between developed and developing countries. China promotes capacity-building initiatives, infrastructure development, and knowledge transfer as central elements of global AI governance, thereby linking AI to its wider development diplomacy and South–South cooperation agenda and presenting a positive image to the future markets for the made-in-China tech.
2. By presenting **AI as a tool to bridge the digital divide**, China positions itself as a leader of the Global South, linking governance with infrastructure, capacity building, and long-term political alignment.
3. China consistently frames **AI as a domain requiring global governance**, anchored in the United Nations, and positions the UN as the only legitimate platform for rulemaking. This reinforces China's broader preference for institutional multilateralism, where decision-making is inclusive in form but embedded within state-centric sovereignty principles.
4. China combines **references to domestic regulation, UN initiatives, and risk awareness** to construct an image of a responsible AI leader, legitimising its role as both rule-maker and implementer in global governance.
5. China's discourse **omits key issues such as data governance, surveillance practices, and enforcement mechanisms**, allowing it to promote global norms while maintaining domestic control and strategic autonomy.
6. Although references to the United States significantly amplify the presence of hegemonic framing, AI discourse remains largely detached from it. Even as geopolitical language intensifies, **AI still continues to be framed outside of direct power rivalry narratives**.

## INTRODUCTION

As artificial intelligence increasingly shapes today's global technology, economy and society, its governance has become a key issue at international venues. Within the United Nations, China has been positioning itself as an AI normative leader and promoting artificial intelligence as a "development equaliser".

China's discourse on AI centres around bridging the digital divide between the Global North and the Global South. By promoting UN-centred multilateralism, Beijing tries to maintain the AI discourse around vague principles and non-binding rules and to omit discussions about more problematic legal commitments, surveillance or data governance.

This policy brief analyses the thematic patterns within China's UN discourse to determine how it constructs its image as a responsible AI power.

To analyse these dynamics, we posed the following research questions:

- What topics dominated China's UN discourse in the years 2024-2025?
- What are the central features of China's AI narratives at the UN?
- Are there any AI Governance aspects that are being purposefully omitted in China's discourse?

## RESEARCH PROCESS

The dataset consists of 794 documents, comprising speeches delivered by Chinese diplomats at the United Nations in the Chinese language (2024-2025). All materials were first collected from the publicly accessible official webpage of the China Permanent Mission to the UN and subsequently converted into .txt format for analysis. The corpus was then imported into MAXQDA, where a structured coding scheme was applied. The coding framework included the following categories: development, society, economy, governance, artificial intelligence, security/military, and hegemony/West (in Chinese). Each document was systematically coded according to the presence and frequency of these thematic categories. Following the coding process, the data were analysed using MAXQDA's cross-tabulation tools, which enabled the calculation of relative frequencies

and distributions across the dataset. The results generated through this procedure form the empirical basis for the quantitative findings discussed in the article. Then, to analyse the relationships between thematic categories, this study employs code co-occurrence analysis using MAXQDA. Co-occurrence is defined as the simultaneous presence of two codes within the same textual segment or within a specified proximity window. Co-occurrence is measured at the segment level. A co-occurrence is recorded when two codes are assigned to the same coded segment. This approach captures instances where different themes are discursively linked within a single unit of meaning, such as a sentence or paragraph.

## **MAIN FINDINGS**

Within the Chinese diplomats' speeches in the United Nations, development constitutes the dominant category, accounting for 32.8% (2,764 segments) of all coded speeches. Two additional high-frequency categories, society (23.0%, 1,939 segments) and security (22.9%, 1,930 segments), form a second tier of emphasis. Together, development, society, and security account for nearly 79% of the total discourse, suggesting a tightly integrated narrative linking progress, social order, and stability. A third tier includes governance (7.7%, 645 segments) and economy (7.4%, 619 segments), which appear at comparable levels. Emerging and more specialised themes are captured by AI (3.8%, 322 segments), reflecting the growing but still secondary role of technological discourse. Meanwhile, hegemony & West (2.3%, 196 segments) remains the least frequent category, indicating that explicit confrontational or critical framing toward rival powers is relatively limited and strategically deployed rather than pervasive. However, when references to the United States are included in the category of hegemony and the West, the number of segments increases substantially, from 415 to 648, accounting for 7.6% of occurrences in the analysed documents.

**Table 1 Distribution of Thematic Categories in Chinese UN Discourse**

	Segments	Percentage of occurrences
development	2764	32,71
society	1939	22,94
security	1930	22,84
governance	645	7,63
economy	619	7,32
AI	322	3,81
hegemony&West	232	2,75
total	8451	100,00

Source: authors' own calculations

The strongest co-occurrence is observed between AI and development (40%, 165 intersections), indicating that technological advancement is predominantly framed within a broader narrative of modernisation and long-term growth. A second major linkage emerges between AI and governance (121 intersections, 29,4%). The connection between AI and security (54 intersections) further illustrates the expanding scope of security discourse. AI is increasingly associated with non-traditional security concerns, including cybersecurity, data protection, and systemic resilience. However, the moderate intensity of this linkage suggests that security framing, while present, does not dominate AI-related discourse. More limited but still meaningful interactions are observed with society (36 intersections) and the economy (29 intersections). Finally, the weakest co-occurrence appears between AI and hegemony & West (7 intersections).

Interestingly, when we measure co-occurrence between AI and hegemony & West, with the United States included, the number of co-occurrences does not significantly change; it increases by only one intersection, to 8.

**Table 2 AI Co-occurrence Percentages Across Thematic Categories**

Category	Co-occurrences	Percentage (%)
Development	165	40.0
Governance	121	29.4
Security	54	13.1
Society	36	8.7
Economy	29	7.0
Hegemony & West	7	1.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>412</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: authors' own calculations

## THE MAIN THEMES IN CHINA'S AI GOVERNANCE DISCOURSE

China uses its UN speeches on AI to reinforce its demand for standards and norms of global cooperation centred on vague concepts such as the right to development, sovereignty, a people-centred approach and consensus-based governance. It uses the AI realm to present itself as a major, responsible and normative power and the leader of the Global South, while simultaneously criticising the West.

China's statements at the United Nations articulate a coherent three-part framework for AI governance built on systemic regulation, fairness, and multilateralism. First, China promotes a comprehensive and balanced approach that integrates ethics, security, standards, and institutional mechanisms within a global governance framework, while emphasising a people-centred model and the dual priority of development and security.

“*First, we must adhere to a comprehensive and balanced approach. Artificial intelligence governance involves various aspects, including ethical values, security governance, standards and norms, capacity building, and institutional mechanisms. We should adopt a systemic approach to promote comprehensive and balanced progress, strengthen coordination and cooperation, and build a global governance framework for artificial intelligence. Preferential treatment or selective approaches are neither desirable nor feasible*<sup>1</sup>.

Second, it advances fairness and inclusiveness, framing AI as a common good that should remain open, non-discriminatory, and accessible to all, while strengthening governance tools such as risk assessment systems, regulatory frameworks, and safeguards against misuse, including military applications.

“*Second, we must uphold fairness and inclusiveness. Artificial intelligence is a common asset of humanity. We must adhere to the principles of openness without building walls, interconnectivity without decoupling, and equality without discrimination, working together to create an open, inclusive, universally*

---

<sup>1</sup> 推动普惠发展·弥合智能鸿沟——王毅在人工智能能力建设国际合作高级别会议上的致辞 26.09.2024, [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao\\_674904/zyjh\\_674906/202412/t20241218\\_11496410.shtml](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zyjh_674906/202412/t20241218_11496410.shtml)

*beneficial, and non-discriminatory environment for the development of artificial intelligence, so that the benefits of artificial intelligence can reach all countries. Artificial intelligence should not and cannot become a tool for maintaining hegemony or pursuing dominance.<sup>2</sup>*

Third, China underscores UN-centred multilateralism and international cooperation, rejecting exclusive “small circles,” opposing technological decoupling, and advocating equal participation, particularly for developing countries. Taken together, this framework positions China as a proponent of inclusive, state-led global AI governance while implicitly contesting Western dominance in rule-setting.

““ *Third, we must uphold multilateralism. There is only one system and one set of rules in the world, with the United Nations at its core. We must establish an AI governance mechanism within the UN framework that involves all countries, ensuring equal participation and benefits for all nations. Using one's own values as the sole criterion for judgment will only create artificial divisions and obstacles, hindering humanity's efforts to jointly address new challenges<sup>3</sup>.*

### **AI FOR ALL AND INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT**

China frames artificial intelligence through an “AI for all” narrative, presenting it as a key driver of social progress and development while positioning itself as a leader of the Global South. In this discourse, AI is depicted as an enabling force capable of addressing global inequalities, particularly the widening North–South divide in technology and digitalisation.

““ *Currently, artificial intelligence technology is developing rapidly, and its enabling role is becoming increasingly prominent, making it an important force in promoting social development and progress<sup>4</sup>.*

---

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>3</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>4</sup> 傅聪大使在安理会“人工智能与维护国际和平与安全”公开会上的发言 19.12.2024, [https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/chn/zgylhg/jjalh/alhzh/202412/t20241220\\_11507076.htm](https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/chn/zgylhg/jjalh/alhzh/202412/t20241220_11507076.htm)

“*Against the backdrop of a widening North-South divide in science, technology, digitalisation, and artificial intelligence, it is imperative to uphold the spirit of cooperation, enhance the representation and voice of developing countries, implement the global digital pact, and ensure that artificial intelligence technology benefits the vast majority of developing countries*<sup>5</sup>.

China emphasises the need for inclusive governance, greater representation of developing countries, and the implementation of global frameworks such as the Digital Compact to ensure equitable access to AI benefits. This narrative is operationalised through concrete proposals, including joint infrastructure development, interoperable digital systems, and capacity-building initiatives such as training programmes and knowledge transfer.

“*China is willing to cooperate with all countries, especially developing countries, in the construction of artificial intelligence infrastructure and promote the improvement of a globally interoperable artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure layout*<sup>6</sup>.

“*Third, we will strengthen AI literacy and talent training. China will organise short- and medium-term AI capacity-building training programmes for developing countries, promoting AI popularisation and professional knowledge through a combination of online and offline methods, and sharing AI knowledge, achievements, and experiences*<sup>7</sup>.

At the same time, the emphasis on “equal opportunities,” human-centred development, and respect for national policies embeds core principles of sovereignty and non-interference into AI governance.

---

<sup>5</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>6</sup> 推动普惠发展...

<sup>7</sup> Ibidem.

“China calls on all parties to earnestly implement the resolution on "Strengthening International Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence Capacity Building" adopted by consensus at the 78th UN General Assembly, particularly to help the "Global South" benefit equally from the development of artificial intelligence and continuously bridge the intelligence gap. China is committed to dialogue and cooperation with all parties to form a broad-based AI governance framework based on full respect for national policies and practices<sup>8</sup>.

“The resolution emphasises that the development of artificial intelligence should adhere to the principles of human-centeredness, intelligence for good, and benefiting humanity. It encourages international cooperation and practical actions to help countries, especially developing countries, strengthen their AI capacity building, enhance the representation and voice of developing countries in global AI governance, and advocates for an open, fair, and non-discriminatory business environment<sup>9</sup>.

### CHINA AS A RESPONSIBLE AI POWER

China frames itself as a responsible AI power by combining normative leadership with practical implementation, thereby reinforcing its position as both a rule-maker and an active provider of global public goods. In this discourse, responsibility is demonstrated through the promotion of international frameworks and initiatives, such as UN resolutions on AI capacity building, BRICS cooperation mechanisms, and multilateral training programmes. China emphasises consensus-based decision-making and highlights the broad support for its initiatives as evidence of legitimacy and leadership.

“Within the BRICS framework, China and other members agreed to establish an artificial intelligence research group, dedicated to strengthening information

<sup>8</sup> 中国出席联合国未来峰会和第79届联合国大会立场文件 19.09.2024,

[https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao\\_674904/zcwj\\_674915/202409/t20240919\\_11492977.shtml](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zcwj_674915/202409/t20240919_11492977.shtml)

<sup>9</sup> 第78届联合国大会协商一致通过加强人工智能能力建设国际合作决议 1.07.2024, [https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/zgylhg/jsyfz/202407/t20240702\\_11445457.htm](https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/zgylhg/jsyfz/202407/t20240702_11445457.htm)

*exchange and technological cooperation, and to developing a broadly consensus-based governance framework and standards for artificial intelligence<sup>10</sup>.*

“ We are both advocates and implementers. Within just two months of the UN General Assembly resolution, the Chinese government and the UN Secretariat jointly hosted the first AI capacity building workshop in Shanghai, with representatives from nearly 40 countries actively participating and achieving positive results<sup>11</sup>.

“ The resolution was adopted by consensus, demonstrating that the vast majority of member states agree to strengthen global governance of artificial intelligence through dialogue and cooperation, and fully showcasing China's responsible attitude and important leading role in the development and governance of artificial intelligence<sup>12</sup>.

At the same time, it strengthens this image through domestic regulatory efforts, including early policy planning and the introduction of ethical guidelines and legislation on generative AI, projecting itself as a pioneer in governance. Crucially, China integrates a dual narrative of opportunity and risk, repeatedly describing AI as requiring careful management to prevent misuse, including in military and societal contexts.

“ The resolution on "Strengthening International Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence Capacity Building," proposed by China, was unanimously adopted by the 78th UN General Assembly. Subsequently, China proposed the "Inclusive Plan for Artificial Intelligence Capacity Building" and promoted the establishment of the

---

<sup>10</sup> 傅聪大使在安理会...

<sup>11</sup> 推动普惠发展...

<sup>12</sup> 第78届联合国大会协商...

*"Friends Group for International Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence Capacity Building".<sup>13</sup>*

However, the normative framework it advances remains deliberately broad—centred on concepts such as “people-centred development,” consensus, and shared benefits—rather than precise legal standards.

“*China has always been exploring scientific paths for the development and governance of artificial intelligence with a responsible attitude. As early as 2017, in the "New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan," the Chinese government clearly stated the need to grasp the dual nature of artificial intelligence and minimise risks. In 2021, China released the "New Generation Artificial Intelligence Ethical Code," integrating ethics into the entire lifecycle of artificial intelligence<sup>14</sup>.*

### **Critical position vs. the West**

China articulates a critical and relational framing vis-à-vis the West, positioning itself as a cooperative, inclusive, and responsible actor in contrast to what it depicts as exclusionary and hegemonic Western practices. In this discourse, AI governance becomes a site of geopolitical contestation, where China aligns itself with developing countries and frames advanced economies as seeking to monopolise technological advantages and impose rules that preserve their dominance. References to AI not becoming “a game for rich countries” and opposition to “small circles,” decoupling, and supply chain fragmentation reinforce a narrative of resistance against selective and ideologically driven governance. This framing also delegitimises Western regulatory initiatives by portraying them as discriminatory barriers that restrict equal access to emerging technologies.

“*Recently, at the G20 Leaders' Summit in Rio de Janeiro, President Xi Jinping emphasised the need to strengthen international governance and cooperation in*

---

<sup>13</sup> 傅聪大使在安理会...

<sup>14</sup> Ibidem.

*artificial intelligence to ensure that AI is used for good and benefits all mankind, and to prevent it from becoming "a game for rich countries and the rich."*<sup>15</sup>

“ Artificial intelligence technology is not a prize for a select few, and global governance should not be dictated by a group of countries. China firmly opposes imposing rules set by a few countries on others and forming "small circles" targeting specific nations. We firmly oppose using ideological lines to create discriminatory barriers that undermine the right of all countries, especially developing countries, to equally utilise emerging technologies. "Decoupling" and "breaking supply chains" will only violate the laws of the market economy, disrupt the international economic order, and destabilise global supply chains. The right path forward is for East-West mutual learning, shared governance, and mutual benefit, seeking common ground and expanding cooperation<sup>16</sup>.

At the same time, China embeds its long-standing principle of sovereignty and non-interference into the AI domain, rejecting the use of technology for political interference or the imposition of external standards. By combining anti-hegemonic rhetoric with calls for inclusive cooperation and mutual benefit, China constructs a discursive divide between a supposedly open, development-oriented model and a restrictive, dominance-oriented Western approach, thereby strengthening its appeal among Global South countries and reinforcing its broader geopolitical positioning.

“ We oppose using the advantages of artificial intelligence technology to spread false information, interfere in other countries' internal affairs, endanger other countries' sovereignty, and maliciously hinder other countries' technological development<sup>17</sup>.

---

<sup>15</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem.

## AI IN THE MILITARY AND DEFENCE

China frames the military dimension of artificial intelligence through a security-responsibility nexus, presenting AI as a “double-edged sword” that embodies both opportunities and risks for global stability. In this discourse, AI is linked to the “future and destiny of all mankind,” elevating the issue beyond technical governance to a matter of collective security and ethical responsibility. China emphasises the dangers associated with military applications, including escalation dynamics, disinformation, and social destabilisation, while calling for respect for the security concerns of all states and opposing an AI-driven arms race.

“*Artificial intelligence technology is a double-edged sword; it can be a force for improving social governance and maintaining international security, but it can also be a source of threats to fairness and justice and a threat to peace and stability*<sup>18</sup>.

“*On the critical issue of the military application of artificial intelligence, which concerns the future and destiny of all mankind, China has demonstrated the vision and responsibility befitting a major power*<sup>19</sup>.

At the same time, the emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference signals resistance to external constraints on national technological development. China calls for the respect of the security concerns of other countries and speaks against the arms race dynamics. It also sees AI military applications as potential drivers of „the spread of disinformation, sparking social controversy and ethnic divisions.”<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> 傅聪大使在安理会...

<sup>19</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>20</sup> 傅聪大使在安理会“科学发展对国际和平与安全的影响”公开会上的发言 21.20.2024, [https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/chn/hyyfy/202412/t20241219\\_11504835.htm](https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/chn/hyyfy/202412/t20241219_11504835.htm).

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Based on our analysis of China's discourse on AI over the years 2024-2025 in the United Nations, we argue that the central feature of this discourse is the deliberate use of normative ambiguity. Concepts such as "fairness," "inclusiveness," "people-centred development," and "benefiting all humanity" are repeatedly invoked yet remain vaguely defined, if at all. On the surface, this ambiguity is not incidental but strategic; it is very appealing to the global audience and is the common denominator of China's diplomatic behaviors. It allows China to build a broad coalition of support - particularly among developing countries, without committing to specific legal standards or enforcement mechanisms.

In this sense, China's AI discourse exemplifies flexible norm entrepreneurship, emphasising broad principles that can accommodate diverse political systems and levels of development. At the same time, this approach limits external scrutiny, preserves room for domestic policy variation, and serves as part of the competition with the United States.

Within the Chinese declaration, the AI discourse is closely linked to China's strong emphasis on UN-centred multilateralism. By positioning the United Nations as the primary and legitimate platform for AI governance, China reinforces a model of global order based on state sovereignty and universal participation. According to Chinese diplomats, this stands in contrast to more fragmented or sectoral governance arrangements, often associated with Western-led coalitions or minilateral initiatives. However, this raises an important question: to what extent does China's commitment to multilateralism reflect a genuine preference for inclusive governance, and to what extent is it a strategic choice of venue? The UN, with its one-state-one-vote structure and strong representation of developing countries, provides a favourable environment for China to advance its normative agenda and consolidate political support.

A key tension in China's AI discourse lies in the relationship between sovereignty and global governance. On the one hand, China advocates for international cooperation, shared frameworks, and collective responses to global challenges. On the other hand, it consistently emphasises the primacy of national sovereignty, non-interference, and respect for domestic policies. This dual emphasis creates a governance model that is

multilateral in form but strongly state-centric in substance. While this approach may facilitate broad participation, it also raises questions about the feasibility of establishing effective and enforceable global rules for AI.

The developmental framing of AI constitutes another key pillar of China's discourse. Artificial intelligence is consistently presented as a tool for reducing global inequalities, bridging the digital divide, and accelerating socio-economic progress. This narrative resonates strongly with countries in the Global South and aligns with China's broader development diplomacy, including infrastructure investment and capacity-building initiatives. By linking AI governance to development, China shifts the focus away from regulatory constraints and towards access, equity, and technological diffusion. At the same time, this framing serves to legitimise China's expanding role in digital infrastructure and knowledge transfer, raising the possibility that development cooperation may also function as a mechanism for long-term technological and political alignment.

In parallel, China constructs a responsible power narrative, emphasising its role as both a promoter and implementer of AI governance. References to domestic policy frameworks, ethical guidelines, and legislative initiatives are combined with the promotion of international resolutions and capacity-building programs. The frequent emphasis on consensus, particularly the unanimous adoption of UN resolutions, serves to reinforce the legitimacy of China's approach and portray it as broadly supported by the international community. Moreover, the framing of AI as a "double-edged sword" integrates concerns about risk, including military applications and disinformation, into a broader narrative of responsibility and caution. This allows China to position itself as a stabilizing actor, committed to managing the risks of emerging technologies.

At the same time, China's discourse incorporates a clear, albeit implicit, critique of Western approaches to AI governance. By opposing "small circles," technological decoupling, and the imposition of rules by a limited group of countries, China frames itself as an advocate of openness and inclusivity, in contrast to what it portrays as exclusionary and hegemonic practices. This relational framing is particularly effective in appealing to developing countries, which may perceive existing global governance

structures as unequal or biased. However, this raises a critical question: is China's anti-hegemonic rhetoric indicative of a fundamentally different model of governance, or does it represent an attempt to reshape global norms in ways that better reflect its own interests?

Equally important are the strategic silences within China's discourse. Notably absent are discussions of domestic applications of AI in areas such as surveillance, data governance, and algorithmic control. Similarly, issues related to cross-border data flows, private sector dominance, and intellectual property are omitted. These omissions are significant, as they concern core dimensions of power in the AI domain. By focusing on principles such as inclusiveness and development, while avoiding more contentious issues, China can maintain a positive and cooperative narrative without exposing areas of potential vulnerability or contestation.

The absence of binding legal commitments and enforcement mechanisms further underscores the flexible nature of the approach presented by Chinese diplomats. While China actively promotes frameworks, principles, and resolutions, there is little emphasis on how these norms would be implemented or enforced in practice. This suggests that the primary function of the discourse is not to establish immediate regulatory constraints, but rather to shape the normative environment in which future governance arrangements will emerge.

By combining development-oriented narratives, multilateral legitimacy, and anti-hegemonic framing, China seeks to position itself as a central actor in defining the rules of the emerging AI order. At the same time, the selective nature of its discourse—highlighting certain issues while omitting others reflects careful balancing of ambition and constraint.

In this context, China's approach can be understood not simply as an alternative model of AI governance, but as an effort to reshape the existing multilateral system from within, aligning it more closely with its own principles of sovereignty, development, and state-led coordination. The effectiveness of this strategy will depend not only on China's ability to maintain broad international support, but also on how competing models of AI governance, particularly those advanced by Western actors, evolve in response.



**CENTRE FOR  
ASIAN AFFAIRS**  
University of Lodz

# RESEARCH OPINION ADVICE

FIRST OF THIS KIND UNIVERSITY BASED  
THINK-TANK IN POLAND

OPINION-FORMING UNIT

POLITICAL AND BUSINESS ADVICE

ASIA EXPERIENCED TEAM

[www.osa.uni.lodz.pl](http://www.osa.uni.lodz.pl)

